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I. INTRODUCTION
In American Hospital Association v. NLRB1 the United States
Supreme Court reversed a lower court ruling which had enjoined the
National Labor Relations Board2 from enforcing a substantive rule
promulgated under the Administrative Procedure Act's3 rulemaking
procedure. Generally, the rule defines appropriate bargaining units4
in private, acute care hospitals.5 The American Hospital decision con-
firmed the Board's authority to enforce the first substantive rule made
1. American Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 111 S. Ct. 1539 (1991).
2. Hereinafter "Board" or "NLRB".
3. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1988).
4. Generally, a bargaining unit is a group of employees organized for the purposes of
collective bargaining, provided that the group is appropriate for that purpose.
Section 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act provides that "[r]epresentatives
designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of
employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive repre-
sentatives of all employees in such unit." National Labor Relations Act, § 9(a), 29
U.S.C. § 159(a)(1988). The Board has determined that the unit need not be the
only appropriate unit or the most appropriate unit, but only that it be an appro-
priate unit. Morand Bros. Beverage Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 409, 418 (1950), enforced, 190
F.2d 576, 581 (7th Cir. 1951). However, the determination of "appropriateness"
has remained elusive. The determination of appropriateness is guided only by the
broad standard that the determination "assure to employees the fullest freedom
in exercising the rights guaranteed by this Act." National Labor Relations Act,
§ 9(b), 29 U.S.C. § 159(b)(1988). The Board has developed a number of tests
which it has employed in the discretion given it by the Act to determine unit
appropriateness. See 1 CHARLES J. MoRRIs, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw 413-21
(2d ed. 1983).
5. The Final Rule is:
Section 103.30 Appropriate bargaining units in the health care industry.
(a) This portion of the rule shall be applicable to acute care hospitals,
as defined in paragraph (f) of this section: Except in extraordinary cir-
cumstances and in circumstances in which there are existing non-con-
forming units, the following shall be appropriate units, and the only
appropriate units, for petitions filed pursuant to section 9(c)(1)(A)(i) or
9(c)(1)(B) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, except that,
if sought by labor organizations, various combinations of units may also
be appropriate:
(1) All registered nurses.
(2) All physicians.
(3) All professionals except for registered nurses and physicians.
[Vol. 71:937
1992] HARMONY IN HEALTH CARE?
through the rulemaking procedure. It is widely believed that the
(4) All technical employees.
(5) All skilled maintenance employees.
(6) All business office clerical employees.
(7) All guards.
(8) All nonprofessional employees except for technical employees,
skilled maintenance employees, business office clerical employ-
ees, and guards.
Provided That a unit of five or fewer employees shall constitute an ex-
traordinary circumstance.
(b) Where extraordinary circumstances exist, the Board shall deter-
mine appropriate units by adjudication.
(c) Where there are existing non-conforming units in acute care hos-
pitals, and a petition for additional units is filed pursuant to sec.
9(c)(1)(A)(i) or 9(c)(1)(B), the Board shall find appropriate only units
which comport, insofar as practicable, with the appropriate unit set forth
in paragraph (a) of this section.
(d) the Board will approve consent agreements providing for elec-
tions in accordance with paragraph (a) of this section, but nothing shall
preclude regional directors from approving stipulations not in accord-
ance with paragraph (a), as long as the stipulations are otherwise accept-
able.
(e) This rule will apply to all cases decided on or after May 22, 1989.
(f) For purposes of this rule, the term:
(1) "Hospital" is defined in the same manner as defined in the Medi-
care Act, which definition is incorporated herein (currently set forth in
42 U.S.C. 1395x(3), as revised 1988);
(2) "Acute care hospital" is defined as : either a short term care hos-
pital in which the average length of patient stay is less than thirty days,
or a short term care hospital in which over 50% of all patients are admit-
ted to units where the average length of patient stay is less than thirty
days. Average length of stay shall be determined by reference to the
most recent twelve month period preceding receipt of a representation
petition for which data is readily available. The term "acute care hospi-
tal" shall include those hospitals operating as acute care facilities even if
those hospitals provide such services as, for example, long term care,
outpatient care, psychiatric care, or rehabilitative care, but shall exclude
facilities that are primarily nursing homes, primarily psychiatric hospi-
tals, or primarily rehabilitative hospitals. Where, after issuance of a sub-
poena, an employer does not produce records sufficient for the Board to
determine the facts, the Board may presume the employer is an acute
care hospital.
(3) "Psychiatric hospital" is defined in the same manner as defined in
the Medicare Act, which definition is incorporated herein (currently set
forth in 42 U.S.C. 1395x(f)).
(4) The term "rehabilitation hospital" includes and is limited to all
hospitals accredited as such by either Joint Commission on Accreditation
of Healthcare Organizations or by Commission for Accreditation of Re-
habilitation Facilities.
(5) A non-conforming unit is defined as a unit other than those de-
scribed in paragraphs (a)(1) through (8) of this section or a combination
among those eight units.
(g) Appropriate units in all other health care facilities: The Board
will determine appropriate units in other health care facilities, as de-
fined in section 2(14) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended,
by adjudication.
29 C.F.R. § 103.30 (1991).
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Board's use of the rulemaking procedure would be advantageous.
However, the anti-union sentiments of the health care industry, which
led to the promulgation of the rule, may obscure any advantages the
rule was thought to provide.
This Note analyzes the significance the Supreme Court's decision
will have on the seventeen-year dispute between organized labor and
the health care industry over appropriate bargaining units in the
health care industry. Part II notes the historical background which
was the impetus for the promulgation of the rule. Part III analyzes
the legal grounds on which the rule was opposed by the American
Hospital Association ("Association"), and the reasoning of the Court
in upholding the rule. Part III looks at the practical advantages and
disadvantages of rulemaking. Further, Part III analyzes the resistance
to the rule by the Association in the context of the seventeen-year
dispute between the industry and organized labor over appropriate
units in hospitals. Finally, Part IV concludes that, although rulemak-
ing is widely considered to be advantageous, the resistance to unioniza-
tion in the health care industry by the health care industry will not be
deterred by the promulgation and enforcement of the rule.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The 1974 Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act
In 1974, the National Labor Relations Act6 ("Act") was amended to
extend its protection to the employees of all private, nonprofit hospi-
tals, which had previously been exempted from the coverage of the
Act.7 Congress recognized that strikes and similar activities could pro-
duce problems in the health care industry by interrupting patient
care.8 As a result, Congress included in the amendments provisions
that lengthened the strike notice period and required federal media-
tion of disputes.9 The provisions were designed to ensure uninter-
rupted patient care.1 0 The amendments did not limit the number, size
nor composition of bargaining units that would be allowed in acute
care hospitals. Congress left intact the Board's discretionary power to
determine appropriate bargaining units. 1 However, the concern that
6. National Labor Relations Act, §§ 1-19, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1988).
7. Act of July 26, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-360, 88 Stat. 395 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 152,
158, 169, 183 (1988)).
8. St. Francis Hosp., 265 N.L.R.B. 1025, 1026 (1982).
9. National Labor Relations Act, § 8(d)(1)-(3), (g), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1)-(3),
(g)(1988).
10. S. REP. No. 766, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 3-6 (1974); H.R. REP. No. 1051, 93rd Cong., 2d
Sess. 4-6, 8 (1974).
11. The 1974 amendments did not change section 9(b) of the Act. Section 9(b) reads:
The Board shall decide in each case whether, in order to assure employ-
ees the fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by this Act,
[Vol. 71:937
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an undue number of bargaining units in a hospital would lead to inter-
ruptions in patient care was incorporated into the legislative history
accompanying the 1974 amendments. Both the House and Senate
Committee Reports on the legislation contained this statement:
EFFECT ON EXISTING LAW
Bargaining Units
Due consideration should be given by the Board to preventing proliferation of
bargaining units in the health care industry. In this connection, the Commit-
tee notes with approval the recent Board decisions in Four Seasons Nursing
Center and Woodland Park Hospital, as well as the trend toward broader
units enunciated in Extendicare of West Virginia.*
*By our reference to Extendicare, we do not necessarily approve of all of the
holdings of that decision.1 2
This congressional admonition to the Board to avoid undue prolifera-
tion of bargaining units in the health care industry was echoed by sev-
eral members of Congress, most notably by Senator Williams, a
cosponsor of the bill:
While the Board has, as a rule, tended to avoid unnecessary proliferation of
collective bargaining units, sometimes circumstances require that there be a
number of bargaining units among nonsupervisory employees, particularly
where there is such a history in the area or a notable disparity of interests
between employees in different job classifications.
While the committee clearly intends that the Board give due consideration
to its admonition to avoid an undue proliferation of units in the health care
industry, it did not within this framework intend to preclude the Board acting
in the public interest from exercising its specialized experience and expert
the unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining shall be the
employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof: Provided,
That the Board shall not (1) decide that any unit is appropriate for such
purposes if such unit includes both professional employees and employ-
ees who are not professional employees unless a majority of such profes-
sional employees vote for inclusion in such unit; or (2) decide that any
craft unit is inappropriate for such purposes on the ground that a differ-
ent unit has been established by a prior Board determination, unless a
majority of the employees in the proposed craft unit votes against sepa-
rate representation or (3) decide that any unit is appropriate for such
purposes if it includes, together with other employees, any individual
employed as a guard to enforce against employees and other persons
rules to protect property of the employer or to protect the safety of per-
sons on the employer's premises; but no labor organization shall be certi-
fied as the representative of employees in a bargaining unit of guards if
such organization admits to membership, or is affiliated directly or indi-
rectly with an organization which admits to membership, employees
other than guards.
National Labor Relations Act, § 9(b), 29 U.S.C. § 159(b)(1988). See supra note 7.
In fact, a bill introduced in 1973 which would have repealed the health care
exemption to the Act and expressly limited the number of bargaining units to
five, was not passed. S. 2292, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted in, 120 CONG.
REC. 12941-44 (1974).
12. S. REP. No. 776, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1974); H.R. REP. No. 1051, 93rd Cong., 2d
Sess. 6-7 (1974).
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knowledge in determining appropriate bargaining units.1 3
B. Judicial Response
Following the enactment of the 1974 amendments, the Board con-
tinued to apply its long-standing community of interests standard14
when making bargaining unit determinations in the health care indus-
try.15 However, in NLRB v. St. Francis Hospital of Lynwood,16 the
Ninth Circuit held that the Board improperly used the community of
interests standard instead of a disparity of interests standard,17 glean-
ing the disparity of interests language from Senator Williams' remarks
regarding undue proliferation.' 8 Subsequently, the Board attempted
to conform the community of interests test to address the court's con-
cern that the standard may lead to unit proliferation contrary to the
congressional admonition.
The Board's attempts were not widely accepted by the courts.19
The Board's use of the community of interests standard, or some mod-
ification thereof, produced a split among the circuit courts of appeals.
The Second,20 Third,21 Fourth,2 2 Sixth,23 Seventh24 and Eleventh2 5
13. 120 CONG. REC. 22575 (1974)(citation omitted).
14. The community of interest standard was defined in Kalamazoo Paper Box Corp.,
136 N.L.R.B. 134 (1962), as:
[W]here... special separate interests [are] emphasized by the existence
of substantial differences in ... working conditions as distinguished from
those of other employees . . .. [a separate bargaining unit is] war-
ranted....
Factors which warranted consideration in determining the existence
of substantial differences in interests and working conditions included- a
difference in method of wages or compensation; different hours of work;
different employment benefits; separate supervision; the degree of dis-
similar qualifications, training, and skills; differences in job functions
and amount of working time spent away from the employment or plant
situs under State and Federal regulations; the infrequency or lack of
contact with other employees; lack of integration with the work func-
tions of other employees or interchange with them; and the history of
bargaining.
Id. at 136-37.
15. See, e.g., Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. NLRB, 608 F.2d 965, 967 (3d Cir. 1979).
16. NLRB v. St. Francis Hosp. of Lynwood, 601 F.2d 404 (9th Cir. 1979).
17. Id. at 415. The Board has defined the disparity of interest standard to require
that "the appropriateness of the petitioned-for units is judged in terms of [the
community of interests test], but sharper than usual differences . . . between
wages, hours, and working conditions, etc ... must be established to grant the
unit." St. Francis Hosp., 271 N.L.R.B. 948, 953 (1984)(St. Francis II).
18. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
19. E.g., NLRB v. HMO International, 678 F.2d 806 (9th Cir. 1982); NLRB v. Freder-
ick Memorial Hosp., 691 F.2d 191 (4th Cir. 1982).
20. Trustees Of Masonic Hall v. NLRB, 699 F.2d 626, 632-33 (2d Cir. 1983).
21. Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. NLRB, 608 F.2d 965, 968-69 (3d Cir. 1979).
22. NLRB v. Fredrick Memorial Hosp., 691 F.2d 191, 193-94 (4th Cir. 1982).
23. Bay Medical Center v. NLRB, 588 F.2d 1174, 1177-78 (6th Cir. 1978).
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Circuits held that the community of interests test was permissible, but
that it must be accompanied by a clear statement by the Board demon-
strating that it was heeding the congressional admonition against un-
due proliferation. The Ninth26 and Tenth27 Circuits held that the
disparity of interests test was mandated by the 1974 amendments and
accompanying legislative history. The D.C. Circuit held that the ad-
monition to avoid undue proliferation had no effect on the standard
the Board used in determining bargaining units.28 Since section 9 was
not amended, the Board was not required to change its unit determi-
nation standard under the 1974 amendments.29 However, the court
noted that the Board could, in its discretion, switch to another stan-
dard of determination but that "the Board would have to explain its
action adequately, particularly because the Board has always con-
strued section 9 to embody community-of-interest criteria."30
C. St. Francis Hospital
In St. Francis Hospital,31 a representation proceeding,3 2 the Board
adopted a new two-tiered community of interests standard in an effort
to alleviate the concerns raised by several circuits. Under the two-
tiered community of interests test, the Board first determined
whether the petitioned-for unit fell into one of seven groupings of em-
ployees that the Board had previously determined could constitute an
appropriate bargaining unit.33 The seven groupings were: physicians,
registered nurses, other professional employees, technical employees,
business office clerical employees, service and maintenance employ-
ees, and skilled maintenance employees. If the petitioned-for unit fit
one of the groupings then the Board proceeded to the second tier. In
the second tier of the community of interests test, the Board deter-
mined whether the specific employees involved did, in fact, display a
separate community of interests to warrant a separate bargaining
unit.34
In a subsequent refusal-to-recognize proceeding, the Board in St.
24. Mary Thompson Hosp. v. NLRB, 621 F.2d 858, 864 (7th Cir. 1980).
25. NLRB v. Walker County Medical Center, 722 F.2d 1535, 1538-39 (11th Cir. 1984).
26. NLRB v. St. Francis Hosp., 601 F.2d 404, 419 (9th Cir. 1979).
27. Southwest Community Health Services v. NLRB, 726 F.2d 611, 613 (10th Cir.
1984).
28. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 474 v. NLRB, 814 F.2d 697, 711-12 (D.C. Cir.
1987).
29. Id
30. Id at 712, n.65 (citations omitted)(emphasis in original).
31. St. Francis Hosp., 265 N.L.R.B. 1025 (1982)(St. Francis I).
32. A representation proceeding is a challenge brought by either the employer or the
union to the determination of an appropriate unit by a regional director of the
National Labor Relations Board.
33. St. Francis Hosp., 265 N.L.R.B. 1025, 1029 (1982)(St. Francis I).
34. Id
1992]
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Francis 1135 rejected its own two-tiered community of interests stan-
dard and adopted the disparity of interests standard stating, "After
careful and thorough consideration we are persuaded that the major-
ity approach in St. Francis I is contrary to the intent of Congress and
that the adoption of a disparity of interests test can best effectuate our
statutory obligations in health care unit determinations." 36 Board
Members Dennis and Zimmerman, in separately written dissents,
urged the Board to promulgate rules defining the appropriate bargain-
ing units in the health care industry.37
The decision of the Board in St. Francis 11 was appealed to the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals. 38 The court held that the
Board had erroneously determined that the disparity of interests test
was mandated by the 1974 amendments and accompanying legislative
admonition. The court reasoned that the 1974 amendments did not
modify section 9(b) of the Act to require a specific test to be used in
health care unit determinations. The court did not preclude the Board
from using the disparity of interests test nor the community of inter-
ests test. Rather, the court stated that the Board's reasoning for
adopting the disparity of interests test was clearly an erroneous inter-
pretation of the Act. The case was remanded to the Board.
In St. Francis 111,39 the Board explained that it did not find that the
disparity of interests test was mandated by the amendments and con-
gressional admonition, but that the test more closely approximated
the legislative intent of the amendments as expressed in the congres-
sional admonition to avoid undue unit proliferation.40 The Board then
announced that it would engage in rulemaking with regard to bargain-
ing units in the health care industry, and that the disparity of interests
test would be used until such rules became effective. 41
D. Rulemaking
The Board published the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking4 2 in ac-
cordance with the Administrative Procedure Act43 and invited com-
ments at several hearings located throughout the country. The
comment period was extended three times by the Board due to the
overwhelming response from hospitals, hospital associations, employ-
ees, and unions.4 4 Finally, in April 1989, the Board published its Final
35. St. Francis Hosp., 271 N.L.R.B. 948 (1984)(St. Francis II).
36. Id at 950.
37. Id. at 954-55, 958.
38. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 474 v. NLRB, 814 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
39. St. Francis Hosp., 286 N.L.R.B. 1305 (1987)(St. Francis III).
40. Id- at 1305-06.
41. Id- at 1305.
42. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 52 Fed. Reg. 25142 (1987).
43. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(1988).
44. Second Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 53 Fed. Reg. 33900, 33900 (1988).
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Rule45 establishing eight bargaining units in the health care industry:
all registered nurses, all physicians, all professionals except for regis-
tered nurses and physicians, all technical employees, all skilled main-
tenance employees, all business office clerical employees, all guards,
and all nonprofessional employees except for technical employees,
skilled maintenance employees, business office clerical employees and
guards.48
The rule further provided that "[w]here extraordinary circum-
stances exist, the Board shall determine appropriate units by adjudica-
tion," and that any "unit of five or fewer employees shall constitute an
extraordinary circumstance." 47 In addition, the rule did not disturb
existing units nor did it preclude consent agreements ,in accordance
with the prescribed units or any other configuration that a Regional
Director of the Board might approve.48 Finally, the rule limited its
coverage to acute care hospitals and specifically excluded psychiatric
hospitals, rehabilitation hospitals, and nursing homes.49 The rule
states that the Board will determine by adjudication bargaining units
in health care institutions not covered by the rule.O
E. The Lawsuit
The American Hospital Association filed suit in the Federal Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of Illinois seeking to perma-
nently enjoin the Board from enforcing the rule.S1 The Association
asserted that the rule was invalid on three grounds: (1) the rule con-
travenes section 9(b) of the Act which provides that bargaining unit
determinations must be made "in each case," (2) the rule contravenes
the 1974 amendments which mandate that the Board avoid undue
proliferation of bargaining units in the health care industry, and (3)
the rule is arbitrary and capricious.5 2 The district court issued an in-
junction, finding that the rule violated the congressional admonition
to avoid undue proliferation of bargaining units in the health care in-
dustry.5 3 The court did not specifically rule on the other grounds as-
serted by the Association.54 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed.5 5 The Seventh Circuit held that the rulemaking
45. Final Rule, 54 Fed. Reg. 16336 (1989)(codified at 29 C.F.R. § 103.30 (1991)). See
supra note 5 for the full text of the Final Rule.
46. 29 C.F.R. § 103.30(a)(1)-(8)(1991).
47. I& at § 103.30(a),(b)(1991).
48. Id. at § 103.30(c),(d).
49. I& at § 103.30(a).
50. Id. at § 103.30(g).
51. American Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 718 F. Supp. 704 (N.D. IM. 1989).
52. Id at 705.
53. Id at 716.
54. Id.
55. American Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 899 F.2d 651 (7th Cir. 1990).
1992]
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powers of the Board conferred by section 656 of the Act are broad and
explicit, and that rulemaking with regard to bargaining units is not
contrary to the "in each case" language.5 7 The court found that "case"
in this context could mean an individual dispute; an industry or a sub-
set or submarket of an industry; a proceeding; or that the Board is
required to apply its rules, no matter how achieved, on a case-by-case
basis.58 The Seventh Circuit further held that the rule did not im-
properly fragment the health care industry contrary to the congres-
sional admonition.59 Finally, the court rejected the contention that
the rule was arbitrary and capricious.60
On review, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the Seventh
Circuit's decision in a unanimous opinion written by Justice Stevens,61
thus making the rule enforceable by the Board. The Court deter-
mined that the arguments raised by the Association were without
merit. However, the Court "deliberately avoided any extended com-
ment on the wisdom of the rule, the propriety of the specific unit de-
terminations, or the importance of avoiding work stoppages in acute
care hospitals."62
III. ANALYSIS
The rule promulgated by the Board defining bargaining units in
the health care industry has been declared valid by the Supreme
Court. Although the Court did not address the propriety of the rule,
others have argued that rulemaking by the Board would be advanta-
geous in many respects, Few have disagreed with that contention.
However, given the long-standing anti-union animus of the health care
industry, it can reasonably be asserted that the rule will either fail to
display the advantages it was hoped it would achieve, or the presence
of the rule will shift the focus of the industry's anti-union efforts to
areas not covered by the rule, effectively destroying the advantages
the rule creates.
A. American Hospital
Analysis of the Supreme Court's decision in American Hospital
56. Section 6 reads: "The Board shall have the authority from time to time to make,
amend, and rescind, in the manner prescribed by the Administrative Procedure
Act, such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of
this Act." National Labor Relations Act, § 6, 29 U.S.C. § 156 (1988).
57. American Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 899 F.2d 651, 656 (7th Cir. 1990).
58. Id-
59. I&
60. Id. at 660.
61. American Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 111 S. Ct. 1539 (1991).
62. I& at 1547.
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reaps little reward. However, a quick analysis of each of the argu-
ments advanced by the Association is needed.
1. Association's "in each case" Argument
First, the Association claimed that the rule contravened section
9(b)'s mandate that the Board determine appropriate units "in each
case." The Supreme Court found that the language "in each case,"
given the context of section 9(b) and its legislative history, was synon-
ymous with "whenever necessary" or "in any case in which there is a
dispute."63 Thus, that language did not preclude the Board from using
rules to determine an appropriate unit "in any case in which there is a
dispute." The Court rejected the Association's argument that rules
delineating the appropriate unit for an entire industry were qualita-
tively different than rules the Board had relied upon to guide the re-
quired case-by-case determination. 64 The Court refused to
acknowledge that such a distinction could be drawn from the words
"in each case."
2. Association's Undue Proliferation Argument
The Supreme Court affirmed the Seventh Circuit decision and held
that the rule did not contravene the admonition against undue
proliferation. The Supreme Court found that the admonition did not
evince Congress' intent that bargaining units be decided "in each case"
by adjudication.65 The Court further noted that even if the admoni-
tion did instruct the Board to determine units "in each case" by adjudi-
cation, the rule does not contravene the "in each case" language of
section 9(b).66 The Court further found that the admonition does not
carry the force of law and does not require any specific action by the
Board. The Court determined that if the admonition was viewed as a
"post-enactment legislative history" and thus indicated Congress' in-
tent as to section 9(b) when it amended the Act in 1974, then the ad-
monition should be read "as an expression by the Committees of their
desire that the Board give 'due consideration' to the special problems
that 'proliferation' might create in acute care hospitals."67 However,
the Court found that the admonition is "best understood as a form of
notice to the Board that if it did not give appropriate consideration to
the problem of proliferation in this industry, Congress might respond
with a legislative remedy."68 The Court did not address whether eight
63. Id at 1542-44.
64. 1d at 1543.
65. Id. at 1545.
66. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.




units constituted undue proliferation because the Association failed to
raise the argument.
3. Association's Arbitrary and Capricious Argument
Finally, the Supreme Court held that the rule was not arbitrary
and capricious.69 The Court found that the Board had ample evidence
to consider the issue of differences in the industry and that the Board
had adequately found that the differences were not significant enough
to warrant different treatment.
4. Extra-legal Arguments
The Supreme Court specifically refused to consider the propriety
of the rule. The Court stated, "[We have deliberately avoided any
extended comment on the wisdom of the rule, the propriety of the
specific unit determinations, or the importance of avoiding work stop-
pages in acute care hospitals."70
B. Advantages and Disadvantages of Rulemaking
The advantages of rulemaking by administrative agencies under
the Administrative Procedure Act have been touted by many. More
particularly, scholars, courts, and legislators have espoused the use of
that procedure by the Board. The Board had remained reluctant to
employ that method of rulemaking for substantive matters until the
present rule was adopted. The Board, instead, relied on adjudicative
rulemaking, pointing to the flexibility of rulemaking through adjudi-
cation. Few others share the Board's view towards adjudicative
rulemaking.
1. Advantages of Rulemaking
a. Scholars
The advantages of rulemaking by administrative agencies, and by
the Board in particular, have received extensive treatment in litera-
ture.7 3 Perhaps the most comprehensive treatment is that of Charles
69. Id. at 1547.
70. Id.
71. See, e.g., James R. Anderson, Collective Bargaining in the Health Care Industry
after American Hospital Association v. NLRB, 40 DE PAUL L. REv. 505 (1991);
Merton C. Bernstein, The NLRB's Adjudication-Rule Making Dilemma Under
the Administrative Procedure Act, 79 YALE L.J. 571 (1970); Cornelius J. Peck,
The Atrophied Rule-Making Powers of the National Labor Relations Board, 70
YALE L.J. 729 (1961); David L. Shapiro, The Choice ofRulemaking or Adjudica-
tion in the Development of Administrative Policy, 78 HARV. L. REV. 921 (1965);
Berton B. Subrin, Conserving Energy at the Labor Board The Case for Making
Rules on Collective Bargaining Units, 32 LAB. L.J. 105 (1981); Karen S. Koziara
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J. Morris in his article, The NLRB in the Dog House-Can an Old
Board Learn New Tricks?.72 Morris lists eleven reasons that the
Board should engage in rulemaking.
First, Morris argues that the Act is written in broad and general
language with the duty of defining legal detail in accordance with leg-
islative policy left to the Board. Rulemaking, then, is an ideal vehicle
for fulfilling that duty.73 Second, rulemaking allows the Board to ac-
cumulate data beyond that which is possible in adjudication. Accumu-
lated empirical data allow the Board to formulate rules of general
applicability premised on extensive analysis of all data.74 Third,
rulemaking emphasizes broad legislative policy rather than the spe-
cific facts of a specific case. Thus, in rulemaking, the Board can focus
on the facts pertinent to the rule while ignoring minor details on
which a specific case may turn.7 5 Fourth, rulemaking reduces litiga-
tion by providing stability and uniformity. Adjudication, on the other
hand, begets litigation by allowing the parties to test the boundaries of
an adjudicative rule through further adjudication.76 Fifth, rulemaking
uses agency resources more efficiently. The Board may use rules to
determine the outcome of cases which arise time and time again,
thereby avoiding the need to provide reasoning in each case.7 7 Sixth,
rulemaking should provide the Board with more deference in appel-
late review. The rulemaking process would evidence agency expertise
to which the appellate courts would be more likely to defer, and appel-
late review would tend to focus on agency policy and legislative inter-
pretation rather than the specific facts of the individual case.78
Seventh, rulemaking allows the Board to be "pro-active" when
problem areas appear rather than reactive after a problem appears
and reaches the Board in adjudication. Thus, the Board can emphasize
the prevention of unfair labor practices rather than merely remedy
violations.79 Eighth, rulemaking allows the Board to fully articulate
the reasoning behind the rules, including policy reasoning. Adjudica-
tion restrains the Board to the reasoning behind a specific decision.8 0
Ninth, rulemaking assists Congress in its oversight responsibility.
Rules provide Congress with an explicit outline of the Board's sub-
& Joshua L. Schwarz, Unit Determination Standards - The NLRB Tries
Rulemaking, 14 Emp. REL. L.J. 75 (1988).
72. Charles J. Morris, The NLRB in the Dog House-Can an Old Board Learn New
Tricks?, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 9 (1987)
73. Id. at 29.
74. Id. at 29-30.
75. Id at 30-33.
76. Id. at 34.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 34-35.
79. Id, at 35.
80. Id. at 35-36.
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stantive actions. If Congress disagrees with an action, the rule can be
identified with precision and changed by specific legislative amend-
ment. The potential to amend rules without amending the statute is
beneficial as well.8 1 Tenth, Morris argues that the General Counsel
factor is an advantage to rulemaking. Rules would allow the General
Counsel, a separate entity from the Board, to know the Board's stance
on a variety of issues and would allow it to proceed accordingly.8 2 Fi-
nally, rules provide necessary information to the people who need to
know them, e.g., labor negotiators, union officials, and management-
side lawyers.8 3
Morris also argues that substantive rulemaking is important for na-
tional labor policy.84 He contends that the Board's record of enforcing
the mandates of the Act is poor, and that rulemaking is a viable solu-
tion to that problem.85 Further, only when the Board fulfills its statu-
tory duties can the prescribed national labor policy be advanced.
Hence, rulemaking can be valuable in the advancement of the national
labor policy.
b. National Labor Relations Board
In outlining the reasons that prompted the Board to engage in
rulemaking, the Board also noted advantages it hoped to achieve
through the process. The Board listed three reasons for engaging in
rulemaking. First, the Board pointed to thirteen years of unsuccessful
attempts to create a judicially-accepted doctrinal formula for unit de-
terminations.8 6 The advantage of rulemaking, then, would be greater
deference on appellate review. Second, the Board listed the need for
more empirical data in their unit determinations, i.e., data beyond the
scope of the particular case being decided.87 The advantage gained is
the unfettered evidence gathering procedures of the rulemaking pro-
cedure. Third, the Board listed the need for reduced litigation, partic-
81. Id. at 36.
82. Id. at 36-38.
83. Id at 38-42.
84. A statement of the national labor policy is found in section 1 of the Act:
It is declared hereby to be the policy of the United States to eliminate
the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of com-
merce and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when they have
occurred by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bar-
gaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of as-
sociation, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their
own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating.., or other mutual aid or
protection.
National Labor Relations Act, § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988).
85. Charles J. Morris, The NLRB in the Dog House-Can an Old Board Learn New
Tricks?, 24 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 9 (1987).
86. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 52 Fed. Reg. 25142, 25143 (1987).
87. Id.
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ularly where the Board was being asked to decide similar cases time
and time again.8 8 The advantages the Board hoped to achieve by
rulemaking are the same or similar to several of the advantages that
Morris and others have indicated flow from rulemaking.
c. Judiciary
The courts, on occasion, have pointed to rulemaking as an option
that would be beneficial for the Board to choose. The Supreme Court,
in NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co.,89 urged the Board to engage in
rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure Act.90 While not
reaching the specific question of whether the Board had promulgated
substantive rules in adjudication in violation of the Administrative
Procedure Act, the Court suggested that if the Board desired to make
binding rules based on policy, the better vehicle for doing so would be
the rulemaking procedure.91 In NLRB v. Metropolitan Life Insurance
Co.,92 the Supreme Court suggested that the Board could make the
required disclosure of the basis of its adjudicatory decisions by refer-
ence to rules, rather than explaining the basis fully in each case. 93
Thus, the Supreme Court has recognized at least two of the advan-
tages that rulemaking can provide: increased emphasis on agency pol-
icy and increased agency efficiency.
The Seventh Circuit also urged the Board to engage in rulemaking
in NLRB v. Res-Care, Inc.94 The court, in that case, was determining
the standard of judicial review in a section 2(11)95 case. The court
noted that "while the Board is entitled to some judicial deference in
interpreting its organic statute as well as in finding facts, it would be
entitled to even more if it had awakened its dormant rulemaking pow-
ers .... 9
6
88. Id. at 25143-25144.
89. NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969).
90. Id.
91. Id at 764-66.
92. NLRB v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 380 U.S. 438 (1965)
93. Id. at 442-43, 443 n.6.
94. NLRB v. Res-Care, Inc., 705 F.2d 1461 (7th Cir. 1983).
95. Section 2(11) of the Act reads:
The term 'supervisor' means any individual having authority, in the in-
terest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote,
discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibly
to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend
such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such au-
thority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use
of independent judgment.
National Labor Relations Act, § 2(11), 29 U.S.C. § 152(11)(1988).
Thus, a section 2(11) case is a case involving the determination of whether an
employee, or class of employees, falls within this definition of a supervisor.




In 1978, the Senate considered the Labor Law Reform Act of 1978,
or Senate bill 2467.97 If passed, the act would have required the Board
to engage in rulemaking with regard to bargaining units. The Senate
report commenting on the proposed bill stated:
In the 42 years since [the] grant of power [to determine units] was made,
the Board has run thousands of elections and counted millions of votes. The
time has come for it to codify its accumulated learnings and experience so as
to simplify the law, better guide the parties, and permit prompt handling of
petitions for representation elections.
9 8
The Senate report cited several scholars and court opinions in support
of the proposition. The bill ultimately was not passed. However, the
bill does indicate that this country's legislators have considered
rulemaking by the Board to be advantageous.
e. Conclusion
The Board's use of rulemaking under the Administrative Proce-
dure Act is widely considered to be advantageous. The Supreme
Court, scholars, legislators, and the Board itself have listed several ad-
vantages which would be gained by all people involved in the labor
relations field if the Board would engage in rulemaking. Further,
there does not appear to be any widespread resistance to the notion
that rulemaking is advantageous and appropriate for the Board. Few
have argued that rulemaking is inappropriate for the Board or
disadvantageous.
2. Disadvantages of Rulemaking
a. National Labor Relations Board
The group most resistant to rulemaking by the Board has been the
Board itself. "The Board has criticized rule making as a 'cumbersome
process of amending substantive rules that necessarily impedes the
law's ability to respond quickly and accurately to changing industrial
practices.' "99 Indeed, the Board's stance on rulemaking may have
been informed by the Supreme Court and Congress itself. Congress,
in enacting the original Wagner Act,100 provided the Board with broad
97. S. REP. No. 628, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
98. Id. at 19.
99. Merton C. Bernstein, The NLRB's Adjudication-Rule Making Dilemma Under
the Administrative Procedure Act, 79 YALE L.J. 571, 593 (1970)(quoting Congres-
sional Oversight of the Administrative Agencies (National Labor Relations
Board), Hearings Before the Subcommittee of Separation of Powers of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 2, 1663 (1968)(Supplemental
Memorandum of the National Labor Relations Board, Aug. 9, 1968)).
100. Wagner Act, ch. 372,49 Stat. 449 (1935). The Wagner Act is the original version of
the National Labor Relations Act. This original act was never repealed, but was
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discretion in determining appropriate units.' 0 ' When the National La-
bor Relations Act was amended in 1947,102 virtually the same language
as found in the Wagner Act was incorporated into the amended act.1 03
Thus, the Board retained broad discretion in areas outside the limited
restrictions imposed by the 1947 amendments. Section 9(b) has not
been amended since 1947. It has been suggested that Congress' broad
grant of discretion to the Board was due to Congress' recognition that
broad differences in industry and a changing society made it virtually
impossible for Congress to enact strict rules determining bargaining
units.1 04
The Supreme Court has echoed that view. In NLRB v. Hearst Pub-
lications, Inc.,105 a case arising under the Wagner Act, the Court noted
[w~ide variations in the forms of employee self-organization and the complexi-
ties of modern industrial organization make difficult the use of inflexible
rules as the test of an appropriate unit. Congress was informed of the need for
flexibility in shaping the unit to the particular case and accordingly gave the
Board wide discretion in the matter.1 0 6
b. Scholars
At least one scholar has applauded the Board's use of adjudica-
tion. 07 Henry J. Friendly lists several examples of the Board's adjudi-
cation where the Board interprets the broad language of the Act and,
then, outlines specific guides of behavior.108 Friendly does not enter
changed to its current state through a series of amendments in 1947, Taft-Hartley
Act, ch. 120, title I, 61 Stat. 136 (1947); 1959, Landrum-Griffin Act, Pub. L. No. 86-
257, title VII, 73 Stat. 541 (1959); and 1974, Act of July 26,1974, Pub. L. No. 93-360,
88 Stat. 395.
101. The pertinent section of the Wagner Act read:
The Board shall decide in each case whether, in order to assure to em-
ployees the fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by this
Act, the unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining shall
be the employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof.
Wagner Act, ch. 372, § 9(b), 49 Stat. 449, 453 (1935).
102. Taft-Hartley Act, ch. 120, title I, 61 Stat. 136 (1947).
103. The Taft-Hartley Act retained the language of the Wagner Act unchanged, see
supra note 101, but added the following proviso:
[The] Board shall not (1) decide that any unit is appropriate for such
purposes if such unit includes both professional employees and employ-
ees who are not professional employees unless a majority of such profes-
sional employees vote for inclusion in such unit; or (2) decide that any
craft unit is inappropriate for such purposes on the ground that a differ-
ent unit has been established by a prior Board determination... or (3)
decide that any unit is appropriate for such purposes if it includes, to-
gether with other employees, any individual employed as a guard....
Taft-Hartley Act, ch. 120, § 9(b), 61 Stat. 136, 143 (1947).
104. CHARLES J. MoRRis, 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 414-15 (2d ed. 1983).
105. NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
106. Id. at 134 (footnote omitted).
107. HENRY J. FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADMNSmTRATIvE AGENCIES 36-52 (1962).
108. Id
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the debate as to whether rulemaking or adjudication is more appropri-
ate in the field of labor relations. He does, however, suggest that the
Board has been uniquely successful in formulating broad agency pol-
icy and in providing guides for behavior through the use of adjudica-
tion. Friendly recognizes that rulemaking through adjudication may
at times appear to violate the Administrative Procedure Act, but sug-
gests that administrative agencies, in fact, function in that manner, 09
and the courts have upheld agency decisions which have functioned in
that manner.11 0 In summary, Friendly suggests that adjudication has
served well as a means to translate the broad language of the Act,
enunciate broad agency policy, and outline specific guides of behavior.
c. Board Member Johansen
During the rulemaking proceeding, Board Member Johansen filed
a strong dissent, arguing against the particular rule and against
rulemaking generally.' In arguing against rulemaking generally, he
claimed that the rule would produce units that would continue to be
criticized by courts that deem the Board's determinations too rigid,
and that the rule would not reduce litigation in the area of unit deter-
minations.1 2 Further, he argued that the rule would destroy needed
flexibility and could not withstand the complexities of the industry
and its rapid changes." 3
d. Legislators
During a Senate hearing in 1968,114 it was suggested that adjudica-
tion could provide many of the same advantages that rulemaking
could provide.115 For example, it was argued that the Board had am-
ple opportunity to obtain information during an adjudicative proceed-
ing through the use of amicus curiae briefs.116 Also, adjudication
brings clarity to the law through the gradual development of doctrinal
formulas developed in specific cases arising in actual industrial prac-
tice.'1 7 It was also argued at the Hearing that it was not altogether
clear how rulemaking would contribute to the clarity of the law and to
109. Id. at 49.
110. Id. at 51.
111. Second Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 53 Fed. Reg. 33900, 33934-35 (1988).
112. Id.
113. Final Rule, 54 Fed. Reg. 16336, 16347 (1989).
114. Congressional Oversight of Administrative Agencies (National Labor Relations
Board), Hearing before the Subcommittee on Separation of Powers of the Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 1661-62 (1968)(Supplemental Memo-
randum of the National Labor Relations Board, Aug. 9, 1968).
115. Id. at 1662-63.
116. Id. at 1663.
117. Id.
[Vol. 71:937
HARMONY IN HEALTH CARE?
the parties understanding of the law.'18 Finally, the argument was
raised again that rulemaking would make the law too rigid, and would
lead to litigation.119
e. Health Care Industry
The health care industry opposed the rule on a large scale. During
the last comment period 1,465 comments in opposition to the rule were
received by the Board from the industry, while only thirty-five were
received supporting the rule. Only two of the thirty-five supporting
comments were from the industry.120 The Board compiled nineteen
reasons for the health care industry's opposition to the rule.12 1 While
most of the reasons were specifically oriented towards provisions in
the rule, many opposed rulemaking by the Board in general. For ex-
ample, the industry argued that the promulgation of the rule would




121. The reasons the Board compiled were:
The health care industry is unfairly being singled out for rulemaking....
Rulemaking is contrary to the language of section 9(b), requiring a case-
by-case approach .... The Board should follow the case-by-case approach
of St Francis II.... The number of proposed units conflicts with the
Congressional admonition against proliferation.... If the Board estab-
lishes units, there should be only two units, professional and nonprofes-
sional, plus guards.... The proposal will lead to increased organizing by
unions.... Multiple units will result in strikes, repeated strike notices,
jurisdictional disputes, and other disruptions of health care.... Health
care costs will substantially increase as a result of strikes, whipsawing,
work rules, bargaining, and contract administration.... Hospitals will
lose needed flexibility .... The Board did not consider the changes in the
industry such as teams, and the differences between institutions and be-
tween employees.... The particular units proposed, such as RN and
skilled maintenance, are inappropriate.... The implementation of the
proposed rule will lead to increased litigation.... [Tihe Board should not
treat small, rural hospitals as it does other acute care hospitals because
they have less money and staff flexibility, and more overlapping em-
ployee duties. Moreover, disruptions at these facilities would have a se-
vere impact on providing health care and employment for persons living
in their areas since there are few or no other medical facilities
nearby... [One argument against the rule embraced the reasoning of
dissenting Board Member Johansen.] ... [Tihe Board is inappropriately
foreclosing discussion on bargaining unit issues by refusing to hear evi-
dence on issues considered during rulemaking ... [N]o rule should be
made with less than a full five-member Board .... T]he Board should
consider [an] alternative to the rule, such as a Board panel deciding
health care cases.... [Tihe implementation of the Board's proposed rule
will expedite the Board's election process resulting, [sic] in insufficient
time for an employer to respond to a union's organizing campaign....
The extraordinary circumstances provision [is] too narrow.
Final Rule, 54 Fed. Reg. 16336, 16336-37 (1989).
122. I& at 16337.
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ment of individual institutions due to differences in the industry.1 24
C. Rulemaking: Is There a Good Argument Against It?
Most arguments against rulemaking focus on the rigidity of rules.
Indeed, it is the flexibility of adjudication that proponents of that pro-
cess point to when opposing rulemaking. One argument against the
alleged need for flexibility is that adjudication cannot keep pace with
changes in the industry any better than rulemaking. Professor Bern-
stein has argued that
enduring solutions simply are not to be had in a society as dynamic as ours.
The problems, or at least their manifestations, change too fast for the case-by-
case process to keep pace. Rather the method may institutionalize a state of
permanent indecision. Usually we must determine policy on what we know at
the time a decision is required; even if that knowledge is incomplete, it ought
to be as full as systematic inquiry can make it.1 2 5
The argument proceeds, then, that rulemaking is the Board's best
way to articulate broad agency policy to be used in subsequent
adjudication.126
Another argument against the alleged need for flexibility is ad-
vanced by the Board itself. During the rulemaking procedure, the
Board listed as a reason to engage in rulemaking that the industry has
remained substantially the same since 1974 and looks to remain sub-
stantially the same into the future. The Board stated that the same
proposed units have been determined appropriate in hundreds of
cases. 127 Thus, the Board disputes its own reasoning for avoiding
rulemaking. It would seem that the argument that industry changes
too quickly to accommodate strict rules is not borne out by empirical
evidence, at least in the case of the health care industry.
Finally, the Administrative Procedure Act allows rules to be re-
pealed or amended.128 Although this process may be lengthy, the pro-
nouncement of adjudicative rules can be an equally lengthy process.
For example, St. Francis Hospital took nearly five years to decide, and
it was at that time that the Board pronounced the disparity of inter-
ests test as the standard for bargaining unit determinations in the
health care industry.12 9 By contrast, the rulemaking proceeding
123. Id
124. Id.
125. Merton C. Bernstein, The NLRB's Adjudication-Rule Making Dilemma Under
the Administrative Procedure Act, 79 YALE L.J. 571, 589 n.52 (1970).
126. Id. at 590.
127. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 52 Fed. Rg. 25142, 25143 (1987).
128. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(e)(1988).
129. St Francis I was decided on December 12, 1982 and St Francis III was finally
decided on November 30, 1987. As a further note, the original Decision and Di-
rection of Election in this case was issued on November 5,1979, meaning that this
dispute lasted over eight years.
HARMONY IN HEALTH CARE?
lasted less than two years, and the rule became enforceable following
the Supreme Court decision less than four years after the Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking was published.130
In summary, it appears that rulemaking would bestow upon all in
the health care industry substantial benefits. The reasons advanced
for opposing rulemaking or favoring adjudication over rulemaking are
not supported by actual practices of the Board or a realistic analysis of
the rulemaking procedures.
D. Analysis of Rulemaking in the Context of the Health Care Industry
Given that the rule in this case has withstood judicial review, and
that rulemaking appears to be advantageous in general, the question
arises: Why has there been so much resistance to the rulemaking of
the Board in this case? The answer appears to be that the health care
industry has waged a concerted battle to limit or prohibit unionization
in the industry. The industry has suggested that unionization ulti-
mately increases the potential for interrupted patient care. However,
the evidence before the Board during the rulemaking proceeding does
not support that conclusion. Instead, it is reasonable to conclude that
the industry's efforts are motivated merely by an anti-union animus.
1. Industry Anti-union Animus
The admonition responsible for much of the dispute of the last sev-
enteen years can reasonably be viewed as an effort of the health care
industry to include in the 1974 amendments a persuasive statement
that would limit unionization, but which failed to be included in the
amendments. The Seventh Circuit expressed that view when it re-
viewed American Hospital. In deciding the weight to be given the ad-
monition, the court explained that the admonition must be understood
as an effort of the health care industry which was opposed to the
amendments that would extend the Act to cover their employees.' 3 '
By including the admonition warning the Board to avoid undue
proliferation, Congress indirectly limited the number of units which
would be allowed in a hospital. Thus, the admonition had the effect of
eliciting fewer, but larger, units in the industry. It is commonly
known that larger units are more difficult for unions to organize and
are more likely to lose a representation election. On the other hand,
smaller units are easier to organize and lead to more extensive admin-
130. The Notice of proposed Rulemaking was published on July 2, 1987, and the Final
Rule was published on April 21, 1989. The Supreme Court decided American
Hospital on April 23, 1991, less than four years after the Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking.
131. American Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 899 F.2d 651, 657 (7th Cir. 1990).
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istrative costs for the employer.13 2 Thus, even if larger units do pro-
vide more security against interrupted patient care, the larger units
are also less likely to be organized. Thus, it appears that the industry
has had an effective weapon in Congress. By arguing for larger units,
society receives uninterrupted patient care and the industry gets
fewer unionization efforts which are easier to defeat. Hence, the his-
tory of the admonition is best seen as an effort of the industry to limit
or prohibit unionization.
The rulemaking record indicates that the industry was still at-
tempting to limit or prohibit unionization seventeen years later. The
rule was widely believed by the industry to present an opportunity for
unions to increase their organizational efforts.133 Further, by provid-
ing specific guides for unit determinations, the industry would have
less opportunity to challenge a determination in an adjudicative pro-
ceeding. Thus, the rule would strip the industry of a delay tactic used
to defeat union elections.134 The limits which the admonition indi-
rectly imposed on unionization would be lifted, and the benefits of ad-
judication would be lost, if the rule were to become effective. Hence,
by opposing the rule the health care industry would be attempting to
limit unionization at least to the degree that the admonition imposed
limits, and preserve one of its most powerful delay tactics. During the
final comment period, the industry submitted approximately 1,465
comments opposing the rule.135 Of those comments, more than 670
were form letters created by one hospital and sent under the name of
another (or in the case of one form letter, sent with no name filled in
at all).136 Obviously, the industry was waging a large campaign to de-
feat the rule, and retain the limitations which the admonition pro-
vided, and the benefits which adjudication provided.
In sum, although many arguments were raised by the industry dur-
ing the rulemaking proceeding that the rule would have disadvanta-
geous societal impacts, it is reasonable to view the industry's
opposition to the rule as an effort to limit unionization in the industry
and to retain the benefits which adjudication provides.
132. Karen S. Koziara & Joshua L. Schwarz, Unit Determination Standards - the
NLRB Tries Rulemaking, 14 EMP. REL. L.J. 75, 77 (1988).
133. David Burda, NLRB Rules Take Effect After Barriers Lifted, MODERN HEALTH-
CARE, June 17, 1991, at 6.
134. Second Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 53 Fed. Reg. 33900, 33902 (1988)(quoting
Current Developments, BNA Daily Labor Report, Aug. 6, 1987, at A-2; Current
Developments, BNA Daily Labor Report, Sept. 29, 1987).
It is widely believed that delay of a union election will result in a union defeat
in that election. Thus, management gains an advantage by delaying an election
through an adjudication proceeding regarding the appropriate unit. Id
135. Final Rule, 54 Fed. Reg. 16336, 16336 (1989).
136. Id
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2. Social Policy Reasons for Limiting Unionization in Health
Care Industry
Even if the industry's efforts may reasonably be viewed as an effort
to limit unionization in the industry, it is still necessary to ascertain
whether the arguments which focus on the negative societal impacts
of the rule are meritorious. The industry has argued that multiple
units in hospitals, especially multiple units mandated by the rule, will
lead to proliferation of units, strikes, jurisdictional disputes,13 7 and
wage "whipsawing" and "leapfrogging". These problems will in turn
lead to increased potential for interrupted patient care.
3. Merit of Social Policy Reasons
The rulemaking record and unionization trends in the health care
industry do not seem to support the industry's reasons for limiting
unionization in the industry. Evidence received by the Board in the
rulemaking procedure13S indicates that seventy-four to ninety percent
of all hospitals have three or fewer bargaining units,1 39 and that a suc-
cessful organizing effort of one unit in a hospital do not lead to further
organizing efforts.140 Logically, the potential for eight units under the
new rule does not lead to the conclusion that eight units will be organ-
ized. The evidence also indicated that strikes in the health care indus-
try have a lower incidence than in other industries.141 The data
available to the Board indicated that only 3.3 percent of all contract
negotiations in the health care industry lead to strikes.142 The Board
further found that there was no correlation between the number of
units in a hospital and the frequency of strikes.143
The Board found that there is a low frequency of jurisdictional dis-
putes in the health care industry and that there is no correlation be-
tween the occurrence of disputes and the number of units.144 Finally,
the data available to the Board indicated that due to separate markets
137. A jurisdictional dispute is a dispute between competing or conflicting unions rep-
resenting different employees in one company. The dispute arises when an em-
ployer makes a work assignment which each feels entitled to receive. CHARLEs J.
MORAis, 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 1245-74 (2d ed. 1983).
138. It is not within the scope of this Note to challenge or validate the evidence which
the Board relied upon in the rulemaking process. The evidence the Board re-
ported in the published notices is taken as representative of the true state of af-
fairs. It should be noted, however, that studies and conclusions used by the Board
were prepared by interested parties, and may not be statistically accurate.
139. Second Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 53 Fed. Reg. 33900, 33908 (1988). See
also, Karen S. Koziara & Joshua L. Schwarz, Unit Determination Standards -
The NLRB Tries Rulemaking, 14 EMP. REL. L.J. 75, 87 (1988),
140. Second Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 53 Fed. Reg. 33900, 33908 (1988).
141. Id
142. Id




for the different categories of employees in the health care industry,
the occurrence of wage whipsawing and leapfrogging is virtually
nonexistent. 45
In conclusion, the data before the Board during the rulemaking
procedure do not support the industry's conclusion that the rule will
ultimately lead to interrupted patient care. The evidence regarding
strikes, unit proliferation, jurisdictional disputes, wage whipsawing
and wage leapfrogging does not indicate that the the rule will lead to
these problems. Thus, the industry's arguments in support of the con-
clusion that the rule will lead to interrupted patient care do not ap-
pear to be meritorious.
E. Union Organization in the Health Care Industry After American
Hospital
The Supreme Court decision in American Hospital seemingly puts
to rest the industry's efforts to limit unionization in the health care
industry. The industry failed to convince the Board that the rule was
disadvantageous to society and failed to convince the Supreme Court
that the rule was invalid. However, there are still several avenues for
the industry to continue in its efforts to limit unionization in the
industry.
1. Adjudication Within the Rule
The rule has left open several avenues for adjudication proceed-
ings. One such area is the appropriateness of the single facility unit
when an employer owns a number of facilities. 46 Another major area
that has been left to adjudication is the placement of specific job cate-
gories in the appropriate unit. Specifically, the Board indicated it
would decide by adjudication the placement of certain job categories in
the technical unit,14 7 the business office clerical unit,1 48 and the
skilled maintenance unit.149 The rule itself also specifically creates
areas which must be determined by adjudication. First, a union may
request a unit that is a combination of the pre-determined units.150
The Board then must make a determination of whether the unit is
appropriate. The employer could, of course, challenge that
determination.
Second, the rule states, "Where extraordinary circumstances exist,
the Board shall determine appropriate units by adjudication."''s  The
145. Id.
146. Id at 33903.
147. Id. at 33920.
148. Id. at 33924.
149. Id at 33926.
150. 29 C.F.R. § 103.30(a)(1991).
151. 29 C.F.R. § 103.30(b)(1991).
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Board has said that it intends to narrowly construe the "extraordinary
circumstances" exception. Moreover, in order to satisfy the require-
ment of the exception, a party would have to bear the "heavy burden"
to demonstrate that "its arguments are substantially different from
those which have been carefully considered at the rulemaking pro-
ceeding." 5 2 Finally, the rule exempts from its coverage psychiatric
hospitals, rehabilitation hospitals, and acute care hospitals that do not
fall within the definition adopted in the rule.153 It might also be noted
that the rule does not provide a standard by which units will be deter-
mined in these excluded institutions. Therefore, even if the Supreme
Court did decide the weight to be given the congressional admonition,
it is not altogether clear which test-the community of interests test
or disparity of interests test-the Board will adopt when making unit
determinations in these institutions.
The Board has said that it does not consider those avenues to be of
any significance. However, given the history of the industry's efforts,
it is reasonable to predict that efforts will be made to reduce the scope
of the rule through these adjudications. Evidence indicates that sixty-
seven percent of all hospital union elections are stipulated; that is, the
employer and the union agree to the proposed unit. 5 4 Therefore, at
most, three of ten union organization efforts reach adjudication. It has
been suggested that the rule will provide guides to the parties in-
volved, leading to more stipulated elections.s55 However, it is also rea-
sonable to suggest that employers will find reason to challenge a
proposed unit in three of ten elections after the rule becomes effec-
tive. Further, it is not clear that if, after the rule becomes effective,
eighty or eighty-five percent of union elections are stipulated, the ad-
vantages which the Board hoped to achieve would actually appear.
2. Petition to Amend or Repeal the Rule
The Administrative Procedure Act allows any interested party to
petition to amend or repeal a rule.15 6 Thus, it is possible that the
health care industry will make an attempt to amend or repeal the rule
at some time.
3. Congressional Efforts
The American Hospital Association has said that it will not make
any immediate efforts to get Congressional action regarding unioniza-
152. Second Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 53 Fed. Reg. 33900, 33933 (1988).
153. 29 C.F.R. § 103.30(a)(1991).
154. Karen S. Koziara & Joshua L. Schwarz, Unit Determination Standards - The
NLRB Tries Rulemaking, 14 EMsP. REL. L.J. 75, 90 (1988).
155. Id
156. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(e)(1988).
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tion in the industry or the rule.157 However, that option is certainly
open. Further, the Supreme Court's decision in American Hospital
has provided the industry with a poignant argument for Congress. By
pointing to the Court's language indicating that the matter of undue
proliferation is between the Board and Congress, the industry may ar-
gue that it is necessary for Congress to take affirmative steps to indi-
cate to the Board how the Board should proceed in unit
determinations in the industry.
4. Summary
The health care industry has several avenues left open to continue
in its efforts to limit or prohibit union organization. The most impor-
tant of these likely are the issues left open to adjudication by the rule
itself. Placement of specific job classifications might prove most
troublesome for the Board. Prior to the 1974 amendments there was a
potential for fifteen to twenty units in each institution.158 Within each
potential unit, there were numerous job categories. In the late 1980's,
a typical hospital had over 200 job classifications in its budget, and it is
suggested that the aforementioned number may be a conservative
measure of the actual number of job classifications in a hospital.159
Thus, the Board must determine not only which units fall within each
of the units prescribed by the rule, but also which job categories fall
within the prescribed units. Efforts to amend or repeal the rule, or to
influence Congressional action on the rule may not be forthcoming in
the near future, but present opportunities for the industry to upset the
workings of the rule.
IV. CONCLUSION
The rule promulgated by the Board defining bargaining units in
the health care industry will not display the advantages which were
predicted. The anti-union animus in the health care industry, which
arguably led to the promulgation of the rule, will continue to show
itself in areas not covered by the rule, in efforts to repeal or amend the
rule, and in efforts aimed at Congress. However, the industry's imme-
diate response has been to teach institutions how to keep employees
satisfied in order to forestall unionization efforts.160 That has been
the response of the Association also.16 1 The rule has served a valuable
157. Burda, supra note 133, at 6.
158. Second Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 53 Fed. Reg. 33900, 33933 (1988).
159. George J. Annas, et aL, AMERiCAN HEALTH LAv 667 (1990).
160. Burda, supra note 133, at 6. See also, R. Albert, U.S. Supreme Court Decision to
Generate More Union Activity, HEALTH SYSTEMS REVIEW, July/August 1991, at
40; Edward A. Kazemek & Don R. Marshall, A Union Election Never Held Can-
not Be Lost, HEALTHCARE FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, June, 1991, at 15.
161. Burda, supra note 133, at 6.
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function in this regard as it has taken the unionization question out of
the courts and placed it in the hospital. John Sweeney, president of
the Service Employees International Union, recently stated, "'For the
first time ever, the playing field is level for union organizing in hospi-
tals.' "162 So far, John. So far.
Darin Mackender '93
162. David Burda, Hospital Industry Regroups After Supreme Court Upholds NLRB
Rules, MODERN HEALTHCARE, April 29, 1991, at 2.
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